PLA researchers say ADS‑B flight data identify two suspected GPS‑spoofing areas near Israel, report says

Researchers at the People’s Liberation Army’s Information Engineering University say they used publicly available ADS‑B aircraft tracking records to estimate the positions of two suspected GPS‑spoofing sources operating near Israel.

The study, authored by Du Lan and colleagues, analysed 43 days of ADS‑B data and was published online on October 7 in the Journal of Geomatics Science and Technology, SLGuardian reported.

The paper presents the researchers’ algorithm as low‑cost and requiring no additional monitoring equipment, and it frames the method as offering technical support for civil aviation safety and situational awareness in overseas conflict zones.

Using the ADS‑B records, the authors produced location estimates for two separate suspected spoofing areas they described as near northern Israel and the Gaza Strip. The SLGuardian account reproduces the study’s reported positioning errors, which ranged from 10.9 km to 18.9 km (6.7 to 11.7 miles).

The paper, as presented in SLGuardian, gives approximate bearings for the target areas: about 80 km northwest of Haifa for the first area and about 30 km northwest of the Gaza Strip for the second, and it says both areas were in the Mediterranean Sea.

The SLGuardian summary quotes the authors’ description of the method as “low‑cost” and not requiring extra monitoring equipment, and it says the researchers argued the technique is timely for improving situational awareness.

The article also records a caveat from the South China Morning Post that it could not independently verify the study’s findings; SLGuardian adds that the researchers did not explain why their analysis focused on the Israeli military.

The paper’s own account, as reported by SLGuardian, supplies the dataset length, the journal publication date, the estimated error band and the rough geographic descriptions for the two target areas, but SLGuardian makes clear the findings have not been independently confirmed.

The study’s characterization of operational purpose and the claim that the method supports civil aviation safety are presented as the authors’ conclusions rather than as external validation.

No additional sources in the material provided supply independent measurements, operator statements, aviation authority commentary or technical validation beyond the paper and the SLGuardian report.

The single press account documents the dataset and the researchers’ stated error margins, and it reproduces the paper’s geographic descriptions and claims about the method’s cost and monitoring requirements.

Readers should treat the positional estimates as the research team’s analysis with reported uncertainties of roughly 11–19 kilometres rather than precise fixes; the SLGuardian piece and the cited South China Morning Post note the absence of independent verification.