Report ranks Google and Meta Pacific cables among highest sabotage risks
A September 2026 report ranked several undersea cable projects with Google and Meta ownership among the Pacific routes most vulnerable to sabotage. The assessment covered 32 U.S. trans-Pacific cable systems, and its scores were not estimates of attack probabilities.
AI-assisted synthesis · Based on 3 independent reports from 4 outlets · Article text read from 2 of 3 reports · 1 article captured only in partHow it's made
View timeline · 7 entriesWhat happened
Key facts
- A report published in September 2026 ranked trans-Pacific undersea cables by vulnerability to sabotage and what it called China’s gray zone tactics.
- The report said Chinese research ships had spent an extraordinary amount of time apparently surveying undersea cables.
- The index could help identify where to prioritize underwater sensors or patrols.
The brief
A report commissioned by the China Strategic Risks Institute ranked several trans-Pacific cable projects linked to Google, Meta and Verizon among the routes most vulnerable to sabotage.
Its assessment covered 32 U.S. trans-Pacific cable systems and compared their exposure using route segments and selected indicators; the resulting scores are rankings, not probabilities that an attack will occur. The report placed Trans-Pacific Express first, with 100.0 points, followed by E2A at 96.7. TPU scored 85.0 and ranked third, while ORCA received 82.2 and ranked fifth.
Google owns TPU, Meta owns ORCA, and Verizon co-owns E2A with firms in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The projects are described as under development, and the assessment’s scope includes the broader set of U.S. trans-Pacific systems rather than only those three projects.
To produce the rankings, the assessment split cable routes into 20-kilometer segments, applied selected indicators to those segments and combined the segment scores for each system. It cautioned that the totals measure comparative exposure under its method, not the chance of a particular cable being attacked.
The distinction matters: a high rank signals a relative position in the index, not a forecast of an attack. The report said a single outage could strain capacity on direct U.S. links to Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines. That is the concrete consequence it identifies for the infrastructure, tying a cable disruption to pressure on available capacity along those links.
It does not quantify the amount of capacity that would be lost or describe a specific outage scenario. Separately, the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported in October 2026 that China had deployed research vessels equipped with seabed-mapping technology near trans-Pacific cables.
The China Strategic Risks Institute assessment framed its rankings around sabotage vulnerability and what it called China’s gray zone tactics; the vessel activity is a separate report, not a finding that any cable was sabotaged or that the ships caused damage.
A separate analysis cited by Ars Technica adds a different geographic example: The Telegraph reported on October 21 that its review identified more than 500 incidents involving Russian fishing boats loitering near cables connecting the UK to the rest of the world. Some boats followed cable routes, according to that account.
This reporting concerns UK-linked infrastructure and Russian fishing vessels, rather than the Pacific cable rankings or the Chinese research vessels. Taken together, the assessment highlights relative exposure across U.S. trans-Pacific cable systems, while the cited reporting describes vessel activity near cables in both the Pacific and waters connected to the UK.
The documented next question is how cable operators and relevant authorities assess the ranking’s specific outage concern: possible strain on direct U.S. The sources do not identify a planned decision or action by those parties.
Why it matters
- A cable outage could strain capacity on direct U.S. links to Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines, according to the assessment; those named destinations are the specific stakes identified.
- The ranking puts E2A, TPU and ORCA near the top of its 32-system comparison, connecting potential infrastructure exposure to projects owned or co-owned by Verizon, Google and Meta.
- The scores are comparative index totals, not attack probabilities, so their practical meaning is limited to relative ranking under the report’s selected indicators and route-segment method.
What to watch next
- Whether cable operators or relevant authorities assess the report’s stated possibility that an outage could strain direct U.S. links to Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines.
- Whether the China Strategic Risks Institute’s ranking is followed by any stated action concerning the high-ranked E2A, TPU or ORCA projects.
- Whether subsequent reporting documents further activity by research vessels near trans-Pacific cables, following the Center for Strategic and International Studies account.
How it's being covered
Coverage analysisShow details4 source articles · 4 unique outlets · 3 distinct reportsOutlet political mix: Too few rated· 2 Center · 2 unratedWhere the outlets are based: Unknown 50% · US/Canada 25% · Other 25%
How outlets' accounts compare
2 framing differences · 2 uncorroborated claims · 3 information gaps- The China Strategic Risks Institute assessment, as described by Ars Technica, frames the ranking around sabotage vulnerability and China’s gray zone tactics; TokenPost emphasizes the ranking method, scores and the warning that totals are not attack probabilities.
- Ars Technica also discusses Chinese research vessels near Pacific cables and Russian fishing boats near UK-linked cables; TokenPost focuses on the assessment’s scoring and its potential capacity consequence.
- The assessment’s cumulative scores are not probabilities of an attack.
- The assessment says one outage could strain capacity on direct U.S. links to Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines.
- The sources do not report a specific sabotage incident, resulting cable outage, or actual capacity loss.
- The sources do not identify an announced response or decision by cable operators or governments.
- The reported vessel activity near cables is not presented as evidence that any cable was sabotaged or damaged.
Timeline
Developments from this story's sources, dated background we compiled and fact-checked, and our earlier coverage. Each row says which.- Countries adopted the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables.Background · compiled and fact-checked by Updat3
- Trans-Pacific connections developed from the first trans-Pacific telegraph cable, completed in 1902 between North America and Australia and New Zealand through Fiji.Background · from our historical context
- Fiber-optic systems later expanded capacity: TPC-3, the first trans-Pacific fiber-optic cable, began service in 1988.Background · from our historical context
- The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force.Background · compiled and fact-checked by Updat3
- Google and Facebook—now Meta—announced the Pacific Light Cable Network in 2016, a proposed fiber-optic system linking the United States, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Philippines.Background · from our historical context
- In June 2020, the US Federal Communications Commission authorized the US-Taiwan portion but did not approve the proposed Hong Kong connection, following a review by the US government’s Team Telecom committee.Background · from our historical context
- The February 2023 loss of both submarine cables serving Taiwan’s Matsu Islands showed how vulnerable Pacific communications could be to damage at sea.Background · from our historical context
How we got here
The February 2023 loss of both submarine cables serving Taiwan’s Matsu Islands showed how vulnerable Pacific communications could be to damage at sea. Taiwan’s authorities said a Chinese fishing boat damaged one cable on February 2 and a Chinese cargo ship damaged the other on February 8; they did not describe the incidents as proven sabotage.
The legal framework for protecting cables began with the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, which entered into force in 1888. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in force from 1994, set out rights to lay submarine cables and obligations to protect them, including on the high seas and in states’ exclusive economic zones.
Original sources
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